System updates
Restricting the user name in the SAP system
If the user assignment of several transactions is to be verified, where it is not clear whether all transactions have been maintained in the menu of roles, the use of the transaction SE16N is always appropriate. Here you can also see the transactions that were assigned to a role only by the S_TCODE permission object. The result also shows which transaction is included in which role. What experience have you had in identifying specific transactions with user assignment? Do you know of any other ways to solve this problem? About your experiences and.
There are the following reasons that may lead to the termination of this step: TP_INTERFACE_FAILURE: Unable to call tp interface. TP_FAILURE: The tp programme could not be run. For more information, see the SLOG or ALOG log file. CANNOT_IMPORT_DDIC: Unable to import ABAP Dictionary. See the Dictionary Import Log for the cause of the error. AUTO_MOD_SPDD This step checks whether modifications to ABAP Dictionary objects can be adjusted automatically. RUN_SPDD_? This step prompts you to customise your modifications to ABAP Dictionary objects by calling the transaction SPDD.
System replication is better
This makes the technical user the dialogue user and a login in the SAP system is unrestricted. So Johannes logs in with the known password of the RFC user in the production system. Thanks to very extensive permissions, it now has access to all sorts of critical tables, transactions, and programmes in production. With the identity of the RFC user Johannes starts with the technical compromise of the production system... RFC Security: All invented - or everyday threat? Whether a simple trim, altered biometric properties or an encapsulated technical user in the SAP system: the basis of the compromise is the same. A person uses a different identity to gain access and permissions to protected areas. Moreover, the evil in all three stories could have been prevented by pro-activity. When was the last time you thought about the security of your RFC interfaces? Can you say with certainty that all your technical RFC users only have the permissions they actually need? And do you know who exactly knows the passwords of these users? Can you 100% rule out that not now in this moment an SAP user with a false identity infiltrates your production systems? Change now: It's about pro activity! But before you start now and start looking for the "identity converter" (which I really do not recommend!), I suggest that you take root of evil and proactively strengthen your RFC security. So if you want to find out more, I have the following 3 tips for you: 1) Our e-book about SAP RFC interfaces 2) Clean up our free webinar about RFC interfaces 3) Blog post about our approach to optimising RFC interfaces As always, I look forward to your feedback and comments directly below these lines!
All the roles that contain the string "ADM" are considered critical, as they usually refer to administrative roles. When identifying critical SAP permissions, profiles and roles, it should be noted that SAP does propose a concept for names, but this is not always taken into account by applications or its own developments.
"Shortcut for SAP Systems" is a PC application that simplifies or even facilitates many activities in the SAP base.
Daily maintenance: Basis administrators review logs, troubleshoot, and ensure your system is functioning properly.
The editor also allows you to start the query for SQL statements in the background.