Support for adjustments and changes to the systems
Aufbau der SAP Basis
The security of an SAP system requires protection against unauthorised access, e.g. through the secinfo and reginfo files. A cleanly implemented authorisation concept protects against attacks within the SAP system. However, it is also possible to attack your SAP system via the network. Through the RFC Gateway Server, your system communicates with external servers and programmes. One particularly effective way to protect against this are so-called Access Control Lists (ACL). Find out what this is and how you can use it to better protect your SAP system. The SAP Standard offers different approaches for gate protection. All methods combined can provide even greater safety. For example, it is possible to use Access Control Lists (ACL) to monitor exactly which external programmes and which hosts can communicate with the gateway. Another option is to configure the gateway to support Secure Network Communication (SNC). Finally, there are various security parameters for the gateway. This article focuses on the use of ACL files such as secinfo and reginfo files. What is an ACL? Access control lists are files in which permitted or prohibited communication partners can be recorded. For the gateway to use these ACL files, parameters must be set in the default profile of the SAP system and of course the files must be maintained accordingly. With the help of logs and traces, which can be configured for this purpose, a precise investigation can be made in advance of the activation, which connections currently run via the gateway. This allows them to prevent important applications with which your system communicates from being blocked by the ACL files. The rules in the ACL files are read from top to bottom of the gateway to decide whether to allow a communication request. If none of the rules matches the requesting programme, it will be blocked. Network-based ACL The network-based ACL file contains permitted and prohibited subnets or specific clients.
Customers with such a case regularly contact us. Creating a Permission Concept from the ground up is often a time-consuming task. Furthermore, the know-how, which aspects should be dealt with in an authorisation concept and how the corresponding processes can look practical and at the same time audit-proof is often lacking. Our solution: tool-based generation of an individual, written authorisation concept In this situation, we have recommended to our customers the tool-based generation of a written authorisation concept directly from the SAP system. We use the XAMS Security Architect tool, with which we have had good experiences. This includes a template for a revision-proof and comprehensible, written authorisation concept. It includes established best practices for role and entitlement management. The template covers all relevant areas in a permission concept. The included text of the authorisation concept is completely customisable, so that the concept can be tailored to your situation without creating a permission concept from scratch. Dynamically update the written authorisation concept One of the biggest challenges after the development of an authorisation concept is to keep it up to date in the long term and to measure the sustainable implementation in the system. This is achieved by integrating live data such as configuration settings and defined rules directly from the connected system. For example, lists of existing roles or user groups and tables are read from the system each time the document is generated and updated in the permission concept. The following screenshot shows an example of what the appearance in the concept document might look like. Automatically check and monitor compliance with the concept To check compliance with the concept, the XAMS Security Architect includes extensive inspection tools. These cover the rules formulated in the concept and are suitable for measuring the extent to which the reality in the system meets the requirements formulated in the concept.
Transport Management
For example, many customer ABAP programs work by uploading or downloading data. There are potentially large security gaps here that allow access to server data. In addition, the widespread direct invocation of operating system commands that are not covered by a self-programmed authorization check is a major problem. Even though classic SQL injection, i.e., the entry of extended SQL commands, is a potential security vulnerability, it occurs rather rarely in SAP systems. More widespread is the unintentional dynamization of SQL calls because input parameters are not sufficiently checked. The need to check all in-house developments internally for such security vulnerabilities before they are delivered in SAP's own code has led to the development of the SAP Code Vulnerability Analyzer tool.
These cloud resources are integrated with existing on-premises resources and deployments on Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud Platform. The result is a branching web of connections that, in its entirety, creates the Enterprise Hybrid Cloud.
Use "Shortcut for SAP Systems" to accomplish many tasks in the SAP basis more easily and quickly.
Note that generation can take a long time.
The text file in it can be loaded into the Note Assistant with the SNOTE transaction via the Note upload.